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ABSTRACT 
 
In 1961, the Berlin Wall intensified Americans’ existing fears of the Cold War.  The Wall 
exacerbated tensions between the Superpowers and raised the possibility of armed 
conflict, even nuclear war.  This thesis will explore the American public’s reaction to the 
Berlin Wall, from its construction in August through November 1961, at the height of the 
crisis.  I define the public as the media and the masses.  First, I will examine President John 
F. Kennedy’s response in public by using speeches, press conferences and interviews that 
brought reactions from the media and the masses.  Second, I will investigate magazine and 
newspaper editorialists’ responses concerning the Berlin Wall.  Third, using the “Letters to 
the Editor” section of American newspapers and polling data, I will try to explain how 
average Americans viewed the crisis.  The public response must be considered within the 
larger contexts of the ever-present fear of nuclear war and Soviet communism.   
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Introduction 
In the middle of the night on August 13, 1961, the Soviet-controlled German 
Democratic Republic, colloquially known as East Germany, began constructing a wall that 
encircled West Berlin, which the United States, Britain, and France had occupied since the 
end of World War II.  The Berlin Wall established the physical division of East and West 
Berlin; it also separated the ideals of the communist Soviet Union and capitalist America 
and Western Europe.  This tangible representation of the Iron Curtain became the cardinal 
symbol of the Cold War, and Berlin became the center of the superpower conflict.  As a 
result of the Wall, Berliners experienced a radical change in their lives; many lost contact 
with loved ones and were unable to attend school or work on the other side of the barrier.  
Historian, Edith Sheffer explains the German experiences on that fateful Sunday morning: 
“East Berliners jumped out of buildings and ran through gunfire to escape, while anxious 
western crowds and politicians remained mostly non-confrontational.”1   
At the moment that the Wall enclosed Berlin, and both sides watched in horror, 
President Kennedy sailed on his boat, the Marlin, in Hyannis Port with the First Lady, 
Jackie.2  This striking behavior, calm and recreational in the face of a disaster, invoked the 
distance of Berlin; yet the Wall felt much closer to the public as the crisis continued.  The 
American public would see the Berlin Wall as another Cold War defeat.   
In this Cold War battleground, Americans considered how they wanted President 
Kennedy and other national leaders to handle the crisis.  The goal of this thesis is to explain 
                                                          
1 Edith Sheffer, Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 170. 
2 Honoré M.  Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making, (Berlin: Berlin-
Verlag, 1980), 35. 
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how the public viewed the creation of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the way it affected the 
American view of potential Soviet domination of Central Europe and the dangers of nuclear 
war.  I argue that American opinion of the Berlin Wall varied based on geographic region 
and political affiliation.  The thesis is divided into four sections to construct this argument.  
The first section emphasizes Kennedy’s public messages.  The next part examines how 
politically-motivated magazines may have influenced the public.  Finally, this thesis focuses 
on public opinion.  The third and fourth sections analyze letters in local newspapers and 
polling data.   
Historiography  
Historians agree that the Berlin Wall emerged as a result of the tensions of the Cold 
War, and namely from Soviet and American differences over the fate of the two Germanies.  
In terms of the American reaction to the Berlin War, historians focus on President 
Kennedy’s significant role in the crisis.  The academic literature reveals that Kennedy’s 
advisors issued the first historical analyses; they praised JFK’s presidency.  Historians’ later 
works criticize Kenney’s foreign policy initiatives.  Throughout this historiography, the 
scholars present a general consensus that Kennedy was not seeking war, but their views 
vary regarding his actions.   
Historian Campbell Craig notes that the Kennedy historiography has shifted since 
the President’s untimely death.  Kennedy’s assassination “all but guaranteed an uncritical, 
indeed hagiographic, early literature, one written, as it turned out, largely by people closely 
associated with the administration.”3  Specifically, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Theodore 
                                                          
3 Campbell Craig, "Kennedy's International Legacy, Fifty Years On," International Affairs 89, no.  6 (November 
2013): 1368.   
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Sorensen, who were both advisors and friends of Kennedy, wrote “worshipful” books about 
Kennedy’s life soon after his death.  Sorensen admits, “This book, let it be clear at the 
outset, praised John Kennedy and what he has done.”4  Sorensen explains that while 
Kennedy believed the Berlin Wall was “illegal, immoral, and inhuman, [it was] not a cause 
for war.”5  By not risking a war over the Soviet’s dangerous infringement of the agreement 
over Berlin, Sorensen claims that Kennedy made the right decision.  His memoirs 
compliment Kennedy’s tough decisions.   
Like Sorensen, Schlesinger published his account in 1965, only two years after 
Kennedy’s death.  Schlesinger’s positive observations of the presidency make up much of 
the book, which shows little criticism of Kennedy.  He reveals that the Kennedy 
administration discussed its Berlin policy well before the crisis, going back to March 1961.6  
Kennedy later feared that the Wall would bring the end of civilization and that there was no 
“victory in a nuclear war.”7  In terms of real policy, Schlesinger indicates that Kennedy 
properly responded to the Soviet action according to the country’s need.  Much of the 
world, especially West Berlin, felt that the Kennedy administration did not react quickly 
enough, as it had no “contingency plan” for a Berlin problem.8  Schlesinger, however, 
reveals that Kennedy had been planning with his advisors for months for a crisis, and knew 
that he could risk nuclear war if he acted too militantly.  Both Sorensen and Schlesinger 
                                                          
4 Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy: The Classic Biography (New York: Harpers Perennial, 1965), 6.   
5 Sorenson, Kennedy: The Classic Biography, 593.   
6 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F.  Kennedy in the White House (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1965), 386.   
7 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, 391. 
8 Montague Kern, Patricia W. Levering, and Ralph B. Levering, The Kennedy Crisis: The Press, the Presidency, 
and Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 89. 
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present biased memoirs of President Kennedy that nonetheless include good background 
to the crisis.   
German historian Wilfried Loth reveals the issues that Kennedy inherited from 
President Eisenhower’s time in office regarding Berlin.  While Eisenhower held office, 
Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev issued the “Berlin Ultimatum” of November 27, 1958, to 
make Berlin a free, demilitarized city.  The Soviet Union sought to hinder the East German 
refugee flow to West Berlin and to end the military alliances the Allies and the Soviets had 
with the two Germanies.  Khrushchev also demanded that the West recognize the German 
Democratic Republic as a sovereign state; otherwise, the Soviets would render their own 
treaty with East Germany.  In addition, the Western powers would have to receive 
permission from the GDR to gain access to West Berlin.9  Thus, the Berlin crisis did not 
originate with Kennedy, but it was exacerbated during his tenure. 
Furthermore, foreign relations historian Thomas Schwartz attributes Kennedy’s 
slow response to the crisis to “dual containment.”  This policy was “designed to keep both 
the Soviet Union and Germany from dominating the continent.”  The United States feared a 
resurgence of German power that had been displayed during the world wars; instead, 
America preferred to uphold the status quo of a divided, weak Germany.  In addition, the 
United States continued to seek to contain the Communists.  Therefore, America needed to 
remain in Berlin in order to restrain and limit the power of both the former Nazi Germans 
and the Soviet communists.  Moreover, America and West Germany developed a “special 
relationship.”  A “German demand for an American presence” existed for the Germans’ 
                                                          
9 Wilfried Loth, “States and the Changing Equations of Power,” in Global Interdependence, ed. Akira Iriye 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 99.  
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security against a feared Soviet conquest.  In contrast, due to their “continuing mistrust of 
the Germans,” the Americans did not seek German reunification.  This relationship 
continued through the Berlin Wall crisis. “The gratitude of Berliners for American 
assistance […] gave American leaders moral reinforcement and psychological reassurance 
in their struggle with the Soviet Union,” writes Schwartz.  Nonetheless, when little activity 
to save the Berliners emanated from Washington, D.C., residents on both sides of the Wall 
began to lose faith in being rescued by the Americans.”10  With Kennedy’s toleration of the 
Berlin Wall, it appears that the United States and the Soviet Union held similar motives in 
containing Germans.   
Scholars began to criticize Kennedy’s foreign policy in the 1980s and 1990s.11  
Montague Kern, Patricia Levering, and Ralph Levering, The Kennedy Crisis: The Press, the 
Presidency, and Foreign Policy, and Thomas C.  Paterson, Kennedy's Quest for Victory: 
American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 represent this period’s scholarly disapproval of 
Kennedy.  Both narratives offer a rather critical view of Kennedy.  Paterson seems to agree 
with Craig’s analysis: “Today scholars and sensationalists alike have forced us to 
acknowledge a much less flattering portrait of the President.”12   
Kern, Levering, and Levering analyze Kennedy’s first international meeting on 
Berlin at the Vienna Conference in June 1961.  The conference gave Khrushchev and 
Kennedy the opportunity to meet for the first time.  At the summit, Khrushchev reissued 
the 1958 ultimatum concerning Berlin, demanding that the Allies sign a peace treaty with 
                                                          
10 Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), 299, 300, 306, 306. 
11 Craig, "Kennedy's International Legacy, Fifty Years On,"1368.   
12 Paterson, Kennedy's Quest for Victory, 4. 
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East Germany within six months, or the Soviets would create their own treaty that “would 
establish a free city in Berlin and automatically terminate Western occupation rights.”13  
Kern, Levering, and Levering reveal that Khrushchev treated Kennedy like a child, and 
Kennedy left the conference looking very weak. 
The conference was Kennedy’s second unsuccessful interaction with Cold War 
enemies.  Only a few months into his presidency, Kennedy experienced the Bay of Pigs’ 
debacle in Cuba, which made him look weak going into the Berlin crisis.  Kennedy needed 
to show his strength for public approval, especially as the 1962 midterm congressional 
elections approached.  Paterson and Kern, Levering, and Levering show where the 
President stood prior to the Berlin crisis.  These authors obviously disapprove of Kennedy’s 
role in Cuba and Vienna.   
Regarding Berlin, Kern, Levering, and Levering note that when the crisis struck, 
Kennedy was on vacation and thus only “authorized a mild statement protesting the 
illegality of the Wall.”14  The President took several days before he began to attempt to 
relieve the crisis.  Despite that fact that Paterson was typically critical of Kennedy, Paterson 
reveals that Kennedy feared a chain reaction if America lost Berlin; thus, he had to 
demonstrate America’s power.  Although Kennedy succeeded in avoiding war, the 
administration had to prove America’s “military resolve.” Paterson asserts that Kennedy 
did not seek war since “American and Russian leaders understood that gunfire could 
quickly escalate to nuclear war.”15    
                                                          
13 Kern, Levering, and Levering, The Kennedy Crisis, 61. 
14  Ibid., 89. 
15 Paterson, Kennedy's Quest for Victory, 38. 
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Therefore, even as Kennedy encouraged an increase in military spending, he also 
pressed for negotiations.  In addition, JFK told Americans to protect themselves in case of 
nuclear war, though Paterson does not detail the public’s reaction to this sentiment.  
Scholars repeatedly emphasize the leaders’ reactions, but give no assessment of public 
response.   
Although Paterson and Kern, Levering, and Levering contribute a critical assessment 
of President Kennedy to the historiography, Craig notes, “Over the past decade or so, 
however, a new appreciation of Kennedy’s foreign policies has emerged.”16  Therefore, 
biases about Kennedy have shifted for the second time since his death fifty years ago.  As a 
contemporary historian, Craig includes himself in having a “new appreciation” for Kennedy.  
Craig asserts that even though JFK used “hawkish” language, he successfully kept America 
out of war.17  Kennedy placated Americans with his tough stance, while at the same time, he 
explored ways to avoid war.  In his article, ‘'We Seek Peace, But We Shall Not Surrender': 
JFK's Use of Juxtaposition for Rhetorical Success in the Berlin Crisis,” Kevin W. Dean agrees 
with Craig.  Dean insists that it was Kennedy’s rhetoric of “standing firm while seeking 
peace through discourse with the Soviets” that won him public approval.18   
A significant amount of historians have examined the Berlin crisis, but this thesis 
will improve on the literature by researching the subject with a different focus.  I will add 
to the literature by looking at the effect the Berlin Wall had on American public perception.  
                                                          
16 Craig, "Kennedy's International Legacy, Fifty Years On," 1369. 
17 Ibid., 1374. 
18 Kevin W.  Dean, “'We Seek Peace, But We Shall Not Surrender': JFK's Use of Juxtaposition for Rhetorical 
Success in the Berlin Crisis,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 21, No.  3 (1991): 541. 
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By doing so, the thesis should provide more insights into the JFK mystique and decision-
making in the Kennedy era. 
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Chapter I 
 
President John F. Kennedy’s Public Releases:  
“We seek peace—but we shall not surrender” 
  
With the erection of the Berlin Wall, President Kennedy responded to the crisis 
publicly in speeches, press conferences, and interviews.  Americans understood the 
significance of the Berlin crisis based on the amount Kennedy discussed the topic.  The 
events relating to Berlin provide background to Kennedy’s speeches. As previously 
mentioned, Khrushchev unveiled the Berlin Ultimatum declaring a free Berlin in 1958, 
almost three years before the Vienna Conference in June 1961, when the ultimatum was 
revived.  By the end of July, Kennedy warned the American public of the dangers that might 
ensue due to the Berlin crisis, encouraging civil defense measures by the populace.  On 
August 13, the Soviets built the Berlin Wall, to which Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
responded calmly, but with indignation.  On August 24, JFK warned the Soviets of the 
severe consequences of the erection of the Wall in a speech to Americans.  Six days later, he 
announced a call-up of reservists to active duty while he also tried to negotiate with the 
Soviets.  On September 25, 1961, Kennedy spoke before the United Nations about the 
violations the Soviets had committed in Berlin.  
Moreover, at an October 11 press conference, Kennedy noted a defense budget 
increase, as well as the need for private fallout shelters.  A few weeks later, on October 27, a 
climatic standoff occurred at the Wall.  Both the Soviet and American armies stood ready 
for battle at Checkpoint Charlie over the Allies’ right of access to East Berlin.19  Luckily, the 
event ended peacefully.  November saw renewed worries over civil defense in his monthly 
                                                          
19 Ingo Wolfgang Trauschweizer, "Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie: Lucius Clay and the Berlin Crisis, 1961–62," 
Cold War History 6, no. 2 (May 2006): America: History and Life with Full Text, EBSCOhost, 205. 
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press conferences.  Kennedy gave a speech about diplomacy, followed by another speech 
regarding his fears of American extremism in the face of Berlin.  At the end of November, a 
Soviet journalist interviewed the President about the crisis.  November marks the end of 
the height of the Berlin Wall crisis—little information exists about Americans’ opinions on 
Berlin in 1962.  Kennedy stopped discussing the matter in his speeches and press 
conferences.  Also, pollsters ceased asking Americans about Berlin, and there was little 
material directly related to Berlin in newspapers.  
President Kennedy first addressed the public regarding the possibility of war with 
the Soviets over Berlin less than a month prior to the Berlin Wall.  His fears stemmed from 
the Vienna Conference, when Khrushchev had threatened to disturb the peace in Berlin.  
Unlike in the June Vienna meeting, in July, Kennedy firmly responded to the Soviets 
regarding Berlin.  He absolved America from any future blame of a war over Berlin; 
Moscow had initiated the crisis.  JFK insisted, “We do not want to fight—but we have fought 
before.”20   Here, Kennedy’s remark showed that the United States had unwillingly fought in 
wars before because of Germany, but both times, America emerged victorious.  His 
comment—that America had not chosen to fight previously—may have served as a 
warning to Khrushchev that the United States was a powerful foe of the Soviets.  Kennedy 
also stated, “Berlin is not part of East Germany, but a separate territory under the control of 
the allied powers.”  Thus, America would not allow the Soviets to threaten its legal right to 
access in the city.  Therefore, JFK promised, “An attack in that city will be regarded as an 
                                                          
20 John F. Kennedy, “Radio and television report to the American people on the Berlin crisis,” John F. Kennedy 
Library and Museum, July 25, 1961, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-035-031.aspx, 
2. 
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attack upon us all.”21  Kennedy’s fierce language towards to the Soviets, along with the 
speech’s powerful passages, showed his intensity and his willingness to act militarily if the 
crisis deepened.   
Furthermore, Kennedy forced the Kremlin to acknowledge that the United States 
was strengthening its military.  The second half of the speech not only addressed America’s 
upcoming military preparations for the Soviet’s benefit, but it also readied Americans for 
the looming sacrifices that may arise from this crisis.  JFK maintained that he would not 
hesitate to do anything in his power to keep the peace, including using “more men, more 
taxes, control or other new powers” to prosecute the Cold War and deal with the crisis.22  
He contended that with the six billion dollar increase in budget spending since his 
inauguration in January, the American public might have to pay new taxes.  Few presidents 
in history have admitted to a tax increase and could make it sound as patriotic as Kennedy 
did!  He also illuminated the country’s need for civil defense, including public fallout 
shelters and available resources in case of a nuclear attack.  This speech is impressive in 
that it discussed the possible upcoming dangers, although some may say to the point of 
fear-mongering.  At the same time, Kennedy showed his, and America’s, strong-will.  He 
dedicated this lengthy address solely to the topic of Berlin before it became a primary 
concern for Americans.  He concluded the speech with this potent sentence: “We seek 
peace—but we shall not surrender.”23 
 Once the Soviets created the barrier, Kennedy remained silent on the subject until 
August 24, thirteen days after the Wall went up.  Instead, Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
                                                          
21 Kennedy, “Report to the American people on the Berlin crisis,” 1, 2. 
22 Ibid., 3.   
23 Ibid., 7. 
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released a statement the day the GDR constructed the Wall: “These violations of existing 
agreements will be the subject of vigorous protest through appropriate channels.” Although 
this language was strong diplomatically, the Kennedy administration’s comment may have 
been seen as politically weak as Americans likely noted little action from the White House 
but “protest.”24  JFK finally offered a statement on Berlin, a single paragraph that gave the 
Soviets a simple “warning.”  He vaguely informed the public of the “consequences” that 
would befall the Soviet Union if it breached access to West Berlin.25  This militaristically 
feeble statement was reiterated in his July speech, but to a less intimidating extent.   
 President Kennedy’s next scheduled speech on Berlin occurred on September 25, 
1961 in New York City, before the United Nations.  This speech included calls for world 
arms reduction and maintained that the West should not abandon Berlin.  Kennedy vilified 
the Russian blockade in Berlin.  He appealed to world public opinion by discussing the 
Soviet Union’s illegal wall, which violated World War II treaties.  The American President 
implored the Soviets to accept a “peaceful agreement,” but the United States “resolved to 
defend, whatever means are forced upon.”26  Kennedy wanted the world to know: “We 
cannot surrender the freedom of these people for whom we are responsible.”27  He 
repeated the determination that Americans heard in the July speech—the United States 
would defend Berlin, even if it meant war, over Russian threats.   
                                                          
24 Dean Rusk, United States-Department of State, August 13, 1961, 776. 
25 John F. Kennedy, “Statement on Berlin Wall,” August 24, 1961.  Quoted in Theodore C.  Sorensen, "Let the 
word go forth": the speeches, statements, and writings of John F. Kennedy (New York: Delacorte Press, 1988), 
263. 
26 John F. Kennedy, “General Assembly of the United Nations,” September 25, 1961, Public Papers, 1961.  
Quoted in Theodore C.  Sorensen, "Let the word go forth": the speeches, statements, and writings of John F. 
Kennedy, (New York: Delacorte Press, 1988), 383. 
27 Kennedy, “General Assembly of the United Nations.” Quoted in Sorensen, "Let the word go forth,” 382. 
Goldberg 15 
 
Although Kennedy spoke about Berlin in his October press conference, he did not 
publically acknowledge Berlin throughout that month.  He returned to the subject with 
vigor, however, on November 16, when he spoke of America’s need for “diplomacy and 
defense.”28  This speech had a more discouraged feel; Kennedy pleaded with Americans to 
understand the United States’ position.  He reminded the public: “There cannot be an 
American solution to every world problem.”  In the 1960s, America could not claim to be 
the world’s sole superpower as it no longer was the only nation that had nuclear weapons 
or benefited from a successful economy.  JFK critiqued the public’s cries either to surrender 
or to disavow negotiations.  If he listened to the former’s criticism, the United States would 
be appeasing its enemy, and if he listened to the latter’s, America “would be at war today.” 
Both extremes would “lead to disaster.”  Kennedy asked the public for a middle ground and 
told his audience that he would “negotiate freely, but we shall not negotiate freedom.”29  He 
promised that the United States would not start a war, but it would react aggressively if the 
Soviets attacked.  Nonetheless, by telling the public that the United States would increase 
arms to “maintain peace,” he disregarded his pleas to the United Nations about arms 
reduction.30  This speech revealed the impact of the harsh criticism that Kennedy received 
at home.  Kennedy needed public support to continue negotiating and remain in the fight 
over Berlin, especially after the disaster of the Bay of Pigs.  The importance of public 
approval was paramount.   
                                                          
28 John F. Kennedy, “The Role of Negotiations,” November 16, 1961.  Quoted in Theodore C. Sorensen, "Let the 
word go forth": the speeches, statements, and writings of John F. Kennedy, (New York: Delacorte Press, 1988), 
395. 
29 Ibid., 394, 395, 396. 
30 Ibid., 393. 
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 Furthermore, only two days after Kennedy spoke on “The Role of Negotiations,” he 
again addressed “The Voices of Extremism,” regarding the public’s uncompromising views.  
He showed frustration with the American cynicism and spoke of the risks of fanaticism.  He 
shared his beliefs that “patriotic” national “confidence,” not “suspicion” made America 
“great.”  Kennedy attempted to encourage Americans to consider the fact that they were all 
on the side of liberty, and thus on the same side of the issues.  He contended that most 
Americans do not “lack the will of wisdom,” so he questioned why various people leaned 
towards an extremist agenda.31  This speech seems similar to the one just days prior; he 
asked the American public to trust his judgments regarding negotiations over Berlin.   
By the end of November, Kennedy stopped focusing on Berlin in his speeches.  On 
November 25, he did, however, grant an interview with a Soviet newspaper, which was 
then disseminated throughout America and the Soviet Union.  Russian journalist Aleksei 
Adzhubei, who was also Khrushchev’s son-in-law, interviewed Kennedy for the newspaper, 
Izvestia, “in the first presidential interview ever granted [to] a Russian newsman.”32  
Kennedy told Adzhubei that he accepted when a country chose communism, but he would 
not consent to forced communism, in a veiled reference to Berlin.33  Kennedy’s insistence 
revealed the importance of free elections.  Kennedy told of his motivation to “prevent 
another war arising out of Germany.”  When Adzhubei spoke of the Soviet fear of a 
resurgent powerful Germany, Kennedy reminded the Soviets: “No one is ever going to 
                                                          
31 John F. Kennedy, “The Voices of Extremism,” November 18, 1961, Public Papers, 1961.  Quoted in Theodore 
C. Sorensen, "Let the word go forth": the speeches, statements, and writings of John F. Kennedy, (New York: 
Delacorte Press, 1988), 395, 397. 
32 "Long Story," Time 78, no. 22 (December 1961): 14.  Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost. 
33 This point may be debatable; history shows that the American government vehemently inhibited the 
spread of voluntary communism. 
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invade the Soviet Union again.  There is no military power that can do that.”34  Americans 
may have seen this admission as submissive to the Soviets by promising that they would 
not attack, regardless of the Wall.   
News Conferences  
Press conferences were especially significant during JFK’s presidency because of 
their popularity.  He was the first president to conduct live press conferences, and the 
public loved them.  The Kennedy Presidential Library notes that “A poll taken in 1961 
indicated that 90 percent of those interviewed had watched at least one of JFK's first three 
press conferences.  The average audience for all the broadcast conferences was 18 million 
viewers.”35  With such a wide viewership, his conferences likely influenced public opinion.   
On August 30, 1961, Kennedy participated in his first conference in response to the 
Berlin Wall crisis.  Reporters were particularly interested in whether negotiations would 
take place as the American president had suggested, or if conflict would result, as the Soviet 
Premier threatened.  Kennedy presumed that force would be a “disaster” and that 
negotiations were necessary for the “human race.”36  Although he talked of the importance 
of negotiations, he told reporters that he encouraged NATO to increase forces in Berlin 
since the United States had already increased reserves, aircrafts, ships, and military 
equipment in anticipation of a Soviet attack.37  Kennedy was preparing for war in the event 
                                                          
34 John F. Kennedy, “Continuing Dialogue,” November 25, 1961, Public Papers, 1961.  Quoted in Theodore C. 
Sorensen, "Let the word go forth": the speeches, statements, and writings of John F. Kennedy, (New York: 
Delacorte Press, 1988), 266, 268. 
35 "John F. Kennedy and the Press,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/John-F-Kennedy-and-the-Press.aspx. 
36 John F. Kennedy, "334 - The President's News Conference," The American Presidency Project, August 30 
1961, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8294. 
37 Ibid.   
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negotiations failed.  In this press conference, one out of five questions related to Berlin, 
showing that the reporters, and thus the public, were disturbed by the crisis. 
 President Kennedy’s next general press conference did not take place for over a 
month, on October 11.  Throughout his presidency, JFK held a conference on “an average of 
one every sixteen days.”38  Considering that he had no press conference in September may 
make one question the delay; was it his preoccupation with the Berlin crisis?  A reporter 
immediately asked for an update on Berlin.  Although he had said in the previous 
conference that he would seek negotiations, Kennedy responded that only “exploratory 
talks” with Moscow had occurred.  He informed the public that with the “constant tension,” 
fallout shelters functioned as the best option for protecting families.  He admitted that 
because of the USSR, and its control over Berlin, Americans “live in the most dangerous 
time in the history of the human race.”39  This comment may have caused fear and may 
explain the public’s general apprehension concerning the possibility of war.  He further 
emphasized the government’s preparation for war by announcing that an additional six 
billion dollars had been added to the defense budget since January.40  In short, he desired 
peace, but his actions pointed toward imminent war.   
 In Kennedy’s next press conference, in the first week of November, home defense 
took precedence over a specific concern with Berlin.  One journalist noted that it “seems to 
have quieted down” in Berlin.41  When a reporter asked about the fallout shelter confusion 
                                                          
38 "John F. Kennedy and the Press,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. 
39 "News Conference 17, October 11, 1961,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum.  
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/Press-Conferences/News-Conference-
17.aspx. 
40 Ibid.   
41 "News Conference 18, November 08, 1961,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/Press-Conferences/News-Conference-
18.aspx. 
Goldberg 19 
 
among the public, Kennedy explained the continuing trepidation over Berlin, admitting that 
it was not “until August that [shelters] became a matter of great public urgency.”42  The 
Berlin crisis prompted the need for civil defense due to the risk of nuclear war with the 
Soviets.   
 Kennedy’s November 29 press conference was the last one of the year.  He 
referenced Berlin but emphasized it less than in previous conferences.  The journalists 
reported that low morale existed among the reservists, and Kennedy ardently responded 
that they had been called up due to the clashes in Berlin.  The reserves gave the United 
States the “choice between humiliation and a holocaust.”43   Kennedy’s comment referenced 
that America would not have to use nuclear weapons, nor would they have to surrender if 
fighting broke out because reserved soldiers served on standby.  Thus, Kennedy bolstered 
the military to avoid nuclear war, which is ironic because he attempted to achieve peace by 
increasing America’s power (though in this case, conventional not nuclear)—the very idea 
of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, or MAD.44  
Kennedy also expressed his desire to improve NATO/Warsaw Pact relations “to 
increase harmony” at the negotiations over Berlin.  He claimed to feel “anxious” to ensure 
access for West Berliners “without constant pressures, and without harassments which 
endanger their freedom.”45  This statement was the first in which JFK acknowledged his 
worries over Berliners.  General Lucius Clay asserted, “If West Germany lost faith in the 
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United States, the country might change course and turn to neutralism and nationalism.”46  
Kennedy sent Clay, a retired military governor, to Berlin as an ambassador because he was 
a popular figure in the city due to his leadership during the Berlin Airlift in 1948.47  Clay’s 
statement revealed Kennedy’s dilemma: America needed to contain the Berliners, out of 
fear of their past nationalism, while keeping the West Germans allied with NATO.  A neutral 
West Germany, not affiliated with NATO, might destabilize the balance of power in Europe.  
Therefore, Kennedy needed to appear committed to the city’s cause, which was the reason 
he spoke passionately about Berliners’ freedoms.   
Moreover, in November, three months after the construction of the Wall, and with 
no new developments on the diplomatic front, Kennedy talked often about Berlin.  He gave 
two speeches, two press conferences, and one international interview, all of which dealt 
with Berlin.  The fact that he spoke so much about the crisis months after its start shows 
how concerned Americans felt about Berlin, especially after the tense standoff at 
Checkpoint Charlie that could have led to a nuclear holocaust in late October.   
Finally, through speeches and press conferences, Kennedy told the public that 
America would negotiate to prevent war, but if the Soviets were imprudent and attacked, 
he would certainly engage in war, either conventional or nuclear.  He warned Americans 
repeatedly to ready themselves for nuclear war by building fallout shelters.  As historian 
Thomas Paterson asserts, Kennedy called for a significant military build-up, while also 
                                                          
46 Trauschweizer, "Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie,” 213. 
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calling for negotiations.48  Such a contradictory policy caused confusion among Americans; 
thus, the reporter’s constant questioning of Kennedy’s actions makes sense.   
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Chapter II 
 
Editorials in Newspapers and Magazines: 
“What is there to negotiate?” 
 
This chapter examines the effect of magazines on public opinion as each periodical 
had a political bias.  Thus, magazines’ political affiliations may have swayed Americans’ 
beliefs.  For example, the National Review took a conservative line; G.H. Nash attributed the 
“cohesive intellectual force on the Right in the 1960s and 1970s” to this magazine.49 
Distributed every week, the National Review influenced conservative thought, and thus 
public opinion, since it ran many editorials on the news.  During the Berlin crisis, most of 
the articles focused on editorials’ disapproval of Kennedy’s “appeasement” policies and 
America’s lack of action in West Germany.   
In the August 19, 1961 issue, the National Review released three separate articles on 
Berlin.  The amount of statements on Berlin shows the importance of the issue in the days 
that followed the construction of the Wall.  Two of its regular columns reveal the 
editorialists’ opinions on Kennedy’s management of Berlin.50  “This Week” suggested that 
while JFK spoke with “resolute firmness,” he “evad[ed] firm decisions.”51  “At Home” also 
acknowledged that the President “talk[ed] big,” however, he seemed ready to “barter away 
rights” of the Allies.  The columnist worried that compromise would mean surrender in 
another area, concluding that “American prestige will slump.”52  The last article addressed 
Khrushchev’s role in the crisis.  The journalist believed that the Soviet Premier would not 
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go to war over Berlin; only if America abandoned the city would Khrushchev be able to take 
Berlin.53  Within a week of the crisis, the National Review harshly criticized Kennedy’s 
actions (or lack of), even though the short time period provided him little opportunity to 
“do something.”54  
The next week’s issue, the article, “Bankruptcy in Berlin,” examined America’s 
“unrealistic” policy concerning Berlin, a policy the author referred to as “Containment—
coexistence—appeasement.”  The editorialist suggested that this policy, which had been in 
effect for the last fifteen years, led to the Berlin crisis.  At this point, the United States was 
simply “waiting for the dust to settle,” per usual.55  The author concluded by asserting that 
America should encourage revolts under the East German regime to tear it apart from the 
inside.  The editorialist of “Closer and Closer” agreed; Kennedy had dawdled over the crisis.  
According to the columnist, Khrushchev believed that if he closed the western frontier, 
“Kennedy would do nothing.”  By allowing Khrushchev to build the wall, Kennedy 
supposedly handed the Soviets a victory.  The editorialist believed a new policy was in 
order to “change our ways” even it meant failure.56  The author believed that America 
should use force for retaliation purposes.  
Like the other editorialists, the author of “At the Ramparts We Fall” wanted 
Kennedy to “do something.” For example, the West could have refused “to respect the 
boundary blockades.”57  The writer offered several directives for the United States, 
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57 The National Review, Editorials, “At the Ramparts We Fall,” September 02, 1961, 2. 
Goldberg 24 
 
including an embargo and sending journalists to Berlin for a “truth airlift.”58  But the author 
disappointedly assumed that Kennedy would “do nothing” in Berlin.59  
On October 7, a few weeks after Kennedy’s U.N. speech, the National Review’s “In 
Vino Veritas” charged that Kennedy would give “maximum concessions” in negotiations by 
merely seeking access to West Berlin.  The writer insisted that these compromises seemed 
to lead to the Soviets receiving 90% of what they had asked.  The columnist felt assured of 
the outcome of the crisis if Kennedy took no action.60  Actually, in Kennedy’s UN address, 
little evidence existed that he would give “maximum concessions,” although he did repeat 
the importance of free access by the Allies to Berlin.  His primary concern regarding the 
speech was establishing the illegality of the Soviet’s actions in Berlin in order to receive 
world support.  If the Soviets restricted access, Kennedy repeated that this action would 
lead to war.  Thus, because JFK’s strongest point embraced this notion of unobstructed 
access, this editorialist assumed that Kennedy did not care about other freedoms in Berlin.   
In contrast to the conservative National Review, The Progressive had a liberal bias.  
The magazine only issued editions once a month, thus yielding less material on Berlin than 
other magazines.  The articles pertaining to Berlin represented an extremely pro-Kennedy 
stance.  The magazine desired disarmament and negotiation in regard to the crisis; issues 
that the President also supported.   
 The articles repeatedly dismissed the claim that negotiating or compromising led to 
appeasement.  For example, in the August edition, the author declared that being 
reasonable was “interpreted as surrender and appeasement.”  Unfortunately for the United 
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States, some of its politicians were “trigger-happy.”61  The commentator advocated for 
Democratic Senator Mike Mansfield’s idea of freedom for the whole city to create 
alternatives to nuclear war.  Furthermore, the September article, by James P. Warburg, 
repeated Mansfield’s policies for both Germanies to be “militarily neutralized.”62  Again, 
Warburg scoffed at the idea that this policy steered towards appeasement.  Both authors 
believed in the need for negotiations to solve the crisis, using new solutions.   
 The November edition of The Progressive responded to Kennedy’s complaints to the 
public about the accusation of appeasement.  In “Flight from Reality,” the author echoed 
Kennedy’s frustration with the “know-nothing cries of ‘appeasement.’”  The editorialist 
encouraged JFK to “talk sense” into the “trigger-happy press” to achieve a negotiated 
settlement.63  This liberal magazine feared the American warmongers, making reference 
numerous times to such phrases as “trigger-happy” politicians and media.  The author also 
scrutinized “Kennedy’s vigorous endorsement” for shelters in case of fallout, which the 
article describes as only “delaying death.”64  Interestingly, however, the writer blames the 
press, not JFK, for exaggerating the need of these bunkers, especially when they would 
serve little purpose.  The Progressive found no fault with President Kennedy on the Berlin 
matter.   
  While Karl E. Meyer’s “Waiting for Kennedy” also felt that the shelter program “had 
a chilling effect” on the populace, and criticized Kennedy’s U.N. speech as “poorly 
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organized,” he did contend that the address allowed a welcome “opening for negotiation.”65  
Furthermore, Meyer characterized the President’s Cold War problems in Cuba and Berlin 
as “bad luck.”66  These articles, although few in number, signify Kennedy’s influence on 
those who were only able to see him as a noble liberal leader. 
Another liberal magazine, The Nation, possessed an unexplained sentiment of 
discouragement.  The general content indicated that the magazine supported negotiations 
and general disarmament.  The editorialists, however, did not think these options would be 
viable because the situation had already escalated due to the Berlin crisis.  The editorialist 
fearfully predicted an international holocaust “by one trigger-happy finger.”67  From August 
to October the mood perceptibly shifted from moderate to absolute hopelessness on the 
subject of disarmament, due to the Berlin Wall crisis.  A September article, “Now What,” 
asked “What is there to negotiate?”68  The author questioned negotiations because America 
was already losing; the USSR had more bargaining chips since the Wall already divided the 
city.  The United States would need to relinquish something simply to return to the status 
quo.  The editorialist despairingly insisted that it was too late for success in Berlin; only 
President Eisenhower could have done something years ago.  This bleak interpretation of 
the crisis reinforced the magazine’s hopeless tone.   
 Furthermore, the articles in The Nation explored ways to solve the crisis using what 
the National Review deemed “maximum concessions.”69  “Statesmen in Strait Jackets” 
contended that Kennedy needed to be “frank” with West Germans—that the East would be 
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legitimately recognized — ending faith in reunification.70  If Kennedy wanted to maintain 
the West’s right to access, he would need the courage to defy public opinion, especially 
since JFK had very high approval ratings at this time.  Three weeks after the magazine’s 
staff suggested more frankness on behalf of Kennedy, the article, “The President and the 
People,” explained that the President’s popularity stemmed from “sentimental reasons” 
because he had produced no obvious successes.  Nonetheless, the author agreed with the 
previous article that Kennedy had to publically convey the realities of compromise so 
Americans would not have to “die for Berlin,” or “be pushed around.”71  In addition, the 
magazine again insisted on East German recognition with negotiations.  These October 
articles indicated that if Kennedy had explained the harsh realities of the Wall to 
Americans, then JFK would be able to submit to some Soviet demands, and ease the crisis.   
 Moreover, the magazine seemed bitter against the citizens of Berlin.  In “We Talk 
Too Much,” the author declared that the United States owed West Germany nothing, 
especially because of its belligerent past.  The Nation published the article in September, 
after Vice President Lyndon Johnson and General Lucius Clay travelled to Berlin with 
American promises to protect the city.  The commentator angrily asserted that LBJ should 
not be treating Berliners as Americans, who he was “duty bound to serve.”72  In addition, 
the article, “The Lame Duck Comest,” does not offer a positive view of the West German 
government.  The critique questioned the rumors of Konrad Adenauer, the West German 
chancellor, coming to the United States to “lay down the law to Kennedy.”73  The author 
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argued that Kennedy now had to make policy in Washington, D.C., not in the West German 
capital of Bonn, as seemed the case throughout the crisis.   
Time Magazine, which does not have an obvious bias, was owned and managed by 
conservatives.  In 1960, in order to render the magazine more moderate, Republican 
owner, Henry Luce, contracted the allegedly moderate Otto Fuerbringer as managing 
editor.  But “Fuerbringer proved far more conservative, partisan and patriotic than even 
[the former editor],” writes a journalism historian.74  Although the magazine’s editorials 
rarely mentioned Kennedy, they leaned slightly to the right in declaring the illegality and 
immorality of the Soviet Union’s actions, additionally suggesting the United States needed 
to “stay tough” on the issue.   
Several of the Time articles determined that the United States must be firm on the 
Berlin crisis.  The first article on the Berlin Wall, “Fait Accompli in Berlin” came out on 
August 25.  It described how the West was “caught flat-footed” when the Wall went up 
because no contingency plan existed.  The United States did not react for several days, only 
revealing its “indecision.” Finally, the United States showed that it would “defend Berlin’s 
independence” by sending General Clay and Vice President Johnson to the city; but the 
author believed that the government needed to implement more aggressive policy.75  A 
month later, the article, “Foul Winds,” deemed that “any show of weakness by the United 
States would be disastrous.” 76  The author believed that Russia tried to incite fear in 
Americans and “hoped to drive the US” out of Berlin.  This Cold Warrior author agreed with 
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Kennedy’s statement: “The US will use arms to honor its commitments.”77  Showing 
strength was the best option.   
Time’s “Response to the Power Play” declared that America must not back down to 
Khrushchev’s demands.  The writer insisted that the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing 
to “intimidate the US” so that America would surrender Berlin.  However, Khrushchev 
failed at “destroying the nerve of the US.”  Instead, angry Americans grew more willing “to 
stand up to Khrushchev and that Berlin was the place” for this showdown.78  Like 
“Response to the Power Play,” “The Wall” revealed the magazine’s disgust with the Soviets 
and their East German puppet, Walter Ulbricht.  The editorialist proclaimed that Moscow’s 
illegal and immoral actions in Berlin revealed the “failure of East Germany’s communist 
system.”  Ulbricht, who colleagues described as “relentless” and coldblooded,” craved the 
leadership of a sovereign East Germany, as Khrushchev promised in 1958.  The Soviets’ 
“massive bluff” in Berlin had only succeeded because of the West’s “wait and see 
reaction.”79  Like the other editorialists in Time, this author wanted American action. 
In contrast, the September 1 articles, “The Tense Hours” and “Guns at the Wall,” 
complimented the U.S. government for its rapid response when Khrushchev threatened to 
cut off air access to West Berlin.  These editorials determined that the Kennedy 
administration had “acted swiftly” and issued a statement that was the “toughest of the 
cold war.”  The statement included a proclamation that if the USSR blocked access, it would 
lead to “aggression for which the Soviet government would bear full responsibility.”80  
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“Guns at the Wall” revealed the Allies’ tough reply to the threat when “within hours a 
thousand heavily armed Allied troops […] were taking positions” at the border.  The 
editorialist reported that while the situation ended peacefully with both Soviet and 
American leaders sending strong notes of protest to one another, the “risk of serious 
accident” was present.  These articles commended America’s response, as the government 
finally did “something.”81   
These magazines may have directly influenced public opinion, especially when 
considering that about a half of a million Americans read each magazine.82  Looking at 
these magazines’ political affiliations, I argue that the editorialists used the Berlin crisis for 
political reasons, as we still see today.  In considering the articles, one could assume that if 
the writer generally supported the President, he/she would support him throughout the 
crisis.  The same holds true for Kennedy’s opposition.  While figures (or letters to the 
editor) are not available to gauge the public’s response to these articles, we can 
nevertheless presume that those who subscribed to these magazines were in general 
accord with the opinions expressed in them.  In any case, the viewpoints in the magazines 
reveal journalistic public opinion on the Berlin Wall crisis. 
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Chapter III 
American Public Reaction through Letters in Newspapers: 
“If Americans don’t care about the freedom of others then they don’t really care about their 
own freedom.” 
 
The views of the somewhat educated masses can be assessed through the “Letters to 
the Editor” section of newspapers in various regions of the country.  Articles from 
newspapers in the West, Midwest, South and East are represented.  Letters can also tell us 
how newspapers with clear political biases tried to influence their readers.  Historians 
Kern, Levering, and Levering write about the newspapers’ political ideologies during this 
time.  Some newspapers were more conservative or liberal than others.  For example, 
regarding the Berlin crisis “clear tilting occurred in the case of the [Chicago] Tribune, which 
favored conservative sources on the issues, and the [Washington] Post, which favored 
liberal sources.”83 
The major newspaper editorialists of this time may have influenced the contents of 
the letters.  The regularity that Walter Lippmann, Drew Pearson, and James Reston 
appeared in the editorial sections, and the amount the letters referenced them, showed 
their influence.  “One of the most respected and influential political writers of his time, Mr. 
Lippmann was for millions of readers the conscience of the nation,” wrote journalist James 
Reston upon Lippmann’s death.  Regarding Berlin, Lippmann, a liberal journalist, believed 
America needed to negotiate with the Soviets because nuclear war was not a feasible 
option.84  Another liberal journalist, Drew Pearson, interviewed Khrushchev in the Soviet 
Union during the crisis.  Although Pearson knew the “public would react angrily”—which 
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proved to be true—he repeatedly published columns about Khrushchev desiring peace.85  
To the disdain of American hardliners, Pearson did not believe Berlin was worth a war.86  
In addition, by the time James Reston, who was described as “hostile” to communism, 
wrote about Berlin, he had already won two Pulitzer Prizes for journalism.  He was a highly 
respected reporter and columnist for the New York Times.87  Concerning Berlin, he thought 
that Khrushchev was misguided regarding Kennedy; Kennedy would not be bullied, nor 
would he “be dishonored without a fight.”88  These journalists all brought the issues of 
Berlin to the households of Americans.   
West  
The Western states, located the furthest from the crisis point and the centers of 
American power, reveal wide-ranging views about the erection of the Berlin Wall.  Western 
historian Earl Pomeroy revealed the “traits of westerners […] seemed to dispose them to 
take part in politics.” He attributes their higher voting rates, compared to the rest of the 
United States, to their high level of education.89  Although their views were wide-ranging, 
most Westerners leaned toward conservatism; three of the last four “major conservative 
presidential candidates of the 1960s” came from the West.90  The 1960 election held 
consistent with this trend; 24 Western electoral districts voted for Kennedy, while 
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Republican candidate Richard Nixon won the majority— 35 of the districts, including 
electoral districts in Oregon, Arizona, and Utah.91  The newspapers that represent the West 
include the Los Angeles Times, The Phoenix Gazette, and the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.  These 
newspapers allow a comparison of citizens in large metropolitan cities, such as Los 
Angeles, to the medium-sized urban center of Phoenix, and finally to the small and remote 
Honolulu.   
The Los Angeles Times highlighted Californians’ various political opinions.  This state 
was a “major zone of attraction for internal migrants,” as well as for Asian and Latin 
American immigrants. By the mid-twentieth century, this diversity led to California 
becoming America’s most populous and richest state.92  While California was relatively 
conservative, the right wing movement “began in earnest in 1958” when the extremist 
Republican majority leader of the U.S. Senate, William F. Knowland, ran for governor.93  
Nonetheless, Knowland lost in 1958, as did Nixon in 1960; Kennedy won in California by an 
incredibly close margin.94   
Furthermore, many of the Los Angeles Times letters stressed preparation for war, 
while others advocated for the United Nations to take charge in Berlin.  Several letters 
asserted that Kennedy had not been aggressive enough in Berlin, and now, war may be 
necessary.  California citizen W.M. Towle suggested that the United States send more 
troops and weapons to Berlin to show Khrushchev its seriousness.  He asserted that the 
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“best way to avoid war is to be prepared for it.”95  Mrs. J.S. Conner agreed with Towle, as 
she maintained that if the United States showed that “we intend to fight, we may not have 
to.”96  Along the same attitude, Arthur Schifferman, a World War II army veteran, detested 
the idea of disarmament as “fuzzy thinking,” since disarmament would lead to America’s 
lack of preparation against the Soviets.97  He admitted that the world should implement 
universal disarmament, but only once “the Kremlin is brought to their (sic) knees.”98  Jim 
Gibson of Los Angeles angrily questioned how two-thirds of Americans thought that the 
Kennedy administration handled Berlin well.  Gibson believed that the United States should 
have torn down “the first strand” of wire along the border.  He claimed that negotiations 
would not improve America’s chance of victory, as it was now too late.99  The letter, 
“Indefensible?” condescendingly argued that the administration used “Liberal 
catchphrases” including “strategically unimportant [or] indefensible” when describing how 
America surrendered to the communists.100  These Californians felt dissatisfied with 
Kennedy’s strategy in Berlin and wanted him to apply methods of war.   
Many of the more pacifist readers of the Los Angeles Times thought that the United 
Nations should settle the Berlin crisis.  Margaret Simkin, a member of the Communist Party 
USA, argued that U.N. troops should enter Berlin due to the imminence of nuclear war.  
Then, American and Soviet troops should leave, an act that would safeguard the Free World 
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against communism and a militarized Germany.101  Other letters featured in September, “A 
Free City” and “U.N. is More, Much More,”102 determined that the world established the 
United Nations after World War II to achieve peace.  Thus, the security organization should 
take control of Berlin until it existed as a free, democratic city.  These letters demonstrated 
the significant faith in liberal internationalist solutions to the crisis.   
Across the Pacific Ocean in Hawaii, the readers of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin felt 
terrified of nuclear war, and more ardently desired fallout shelters than the Los Angelenos.  
The majority of Hawaiians, based on the letters, certainly thought the United States would 
soon become involved in nuclear war.  Thus, many citizens sought fallout shelter 
information or government help.  On August 18, a woman writing under the pen name, “An 
Optimistic Housewife,” noted that “since President Kennedy’s speech on the Berlin crisis, 
most citizens have taken an increased interest in the Civil Defense Program.”103  She 
worried primarily for her and her neighbors’ inability to hear the warning sirens that 
would notify citizens of an attack.  She directly referenced Kennedy’s July speech, showing 
that Americans supported his views that imminent world attack would occur.  John Kudar 
also believed in the need for civil defense; Hawaii needed “a serious study of the most 
effective civil defense system [for] reluctant Americans.”104  Kudar feared nuclear war and 
wanted instruction on useful means for survival.  Other Hawaiians wrote letters, providing 
information to help Americans survive, including “Ideal Survival Food.”  This letter 
reminded Americans that they not only had to store food, but also that specific “survival 
                                                          
101 Margaret T. Simkin, Letters to the Editor, Los Angeles Times, September 06, 1961, B5.  Simkin did not 
specify that she was a member of the Communist Party in this letter.  
102 F.M.  Schlegel, Letters to the Editor, Los Angeles Times, September 11, 1961, B5; Catherine Gammon, 
Letters to the Editor, Los Angeles Times, September 30, 1961, B4. 
103 An Optimistic Housewife, Letters to the Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, August 18, 1961. 
104 John C. Kudar, Letters to the Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, September 02, 1961. 
Goldberg 36 
 
foods” should be set aside.  Even though nuclear war was “not pleasant to think about,” 
Americans needed to make the right preparations to stay alive.105   
Many letters begged the government for support with fallout shelters.  On 
September 13, 1961, Herb Beyer shared his concerns regarding individual shelters—they 
were costly and difficult to build effectively enough to withstand nuclear disaster.  He 
suggested that since the President and Congress had dictated that fallout shelters were a 
national emergency, then they “should treat [the crisis] like a National Emergency” by 
helping to finance and construct shelters.106  A letter from “Concerned Citizen” echoed this 
statement, declaring that “the duty of the state [is] to protect its citizens.”  The author, quite 
an alarmist, also noted that “the Governor warned that Hawaii may be an N-target and told 
the citizens to start preparing.”107  This statement paralleled Kennedy’s calls for 
preparation, but further frightened Hawaiians because now, the state government 
suspected itself of being the target.  Perhaps such strong sentiment “hit home” because of 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor twenty years before.  Hawaiians were still traumatized 
by that event, and thus felt legitimately worried about another attack, regardless of the 
geographic fact that they were far from Russia.   
Moreover, these Hawaiians discussed their preference for nuclear holocaust over 
forfeiting their freedom.  A “Freedom Loving American” declared that the country needed 
to stand up for its principles; the United States must “make any and all sacrifices to protect 
our freedom […] And if the only answer is going to be war, we are going to have to learn to 
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accept it.”108  American principles were paramount.  A Navy wife worried about the 
possibility of nuclear war but preferred that outcome to losing her freedoms.  “Let’s 
prepare for a nuclear war with shelters and second strike capacity that would insure 
victory.”109  Such were common views in Hawaii’s predominant military community, who 
were ready to mobilize to defend freedom in the Cold War.   
Only a few of the Hawaiian letters regarded Berlin as the main component of the 
crisis.  They suggested ways to solve the problem, often peacefully.  On September 12, “An 
Adamant American” advocated for an economic blockade of the Soviets “to thwart many of 
their aggressive tendencies.”110  The blockade would consequently show Khrushchev the 
seriousness of America’s position.  S.T.G. tendered another peaceful solution; the author 
offered that West Berliners move further west and out of East Germany.  Thus, America 
would not appease, nor would it have to go to war.111  Furthermore, Anthony Smolenski 
believed that “The whole Berlin crisis will be solved by negotiation and not warfare.”112 
Smolenski suggested that Americans cease alarming themselves over the danger of nuclear 
fallout.  In addition, F.C.H. Davis responded to an editorial that critiqued Vice President 
Johnson’s actions in Berlin.  “We need to present a united front, not a fearful plea for our 
individual welfare.”113  Interestingly, unlike the Los Angelenos, no Honolulu citizens 
suggested using the United Nations.  Instead, their patriotic reaction showed the view that 
Americans needed to act as a nation to emerge from the crisis.   
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Finally, the people of Honolulu had varying views on Kennedy’s handling of the 
crisis. The recent 1960 election correlated with these varying views of Kennedy; the results 
indicated that Hawaiians were exactly split between Kennedy and Nixon (Kennedy won by 
about a hundred votes).114  In Hawaii, Republicans controlled every legislature until 1955, 
but a year after the Berlin crisis, the Democrats led Hawaii.115  These 1960 election results 
and shift of party controls show the moderate political stance of Hawaiians.  For example, 
in late August, two letters responded to an editorial that claimed that JFK was “not giving 
his all.”116  But another letter, “Respite from Pressures,” determined that Kennedy 
“concern[ed] himself with the welfare of our nation and the world every working 
minute.”117  While both letters passionately believed that the President was working 
zealously on world issues, Colonel Upsilon of Hawaii believed that Kennedy failed to deal 
with the crisis effectively.  He asserted, “Our President did the greatest disservice to his 
country when he pressed the panic button about fallout shelters.”118  The Colonel believed 
that Kennedy wrongly placed fear in Americans; he should have instead warned the Soviets 
to build fallout shelters.  In sum, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin’s letters did not often emphasize 
Kennedy or the Berlin crisis, but rather more general viewpoints on principles and defense.   
 Another Western newspaper, The Phoenix Gazette, seemed to lean slightly to the 
conservative side of the political spectrum.  In the presidential elections between 1952 and 
1960, Arizonians consistently voted Republican by a wide margin.119  Unlike in Honolulu, 
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the majority of the newspapers’ readers disliked the idea of fallout shelters, as they thought 
nuclear preparations showed signs of Kennedy appeasing the world.  For example, John 
Grubyak wrote to explain his reasons for disapproving of JFK.  The President’s prestige was 
“hidden beneath the proposed fallout shelters.”  Grubyak believed that he “clearly shows 
bungling and weakness” with the Berlin crisis—he appeased the communists by not acting 
aggressively with the erection of the Wall.120  In another October letter, William Edwards 
also believed that shelters showed “appeasement and surrender.”  He deemed, “The whole 
world wide panic is part of the present communist line.”121  Moreover, Perry Caudill 
assumed that the government used fear tactics to make Americans “like a mole digging 
fallout shelters.”122  Again, we see the Arizonans reject JFK’s key position regarding fallout 
shelters.  Many of the readers blamed Kennedy for the fallout issue, and did not support 
him on Berlin.  Richard E. Neale, for instance, believed that the Soviets resumed nuclear 
testing “to frighten the free world into slavery through negotiations and concessions.” 
Americans had thus already “fallen—filled with fear— for the trap of Nikky” by building 
cowardly fallout shelters.123  Neale’s letter, like many other Phoenix letters, despised the 
idea of fallout shelters. 
Yet some of The Phoenix Gazette readers expressed the opposite reaction.  For 
example, while most questioned the practicality of fallout shelters, Edward G. Koran 
supported shelters as a proper preparation for war.  Koran believed that shelters deterred 
the Soviets from nuclear war because Americans felt protected by shelters, and thus they 
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“[would] not submit.”  He argued that shelters did not lead to appeasement because those 
who acted desperately, and who did not have shelters, were more willing to appease.124   In 
addition, high school student Paul Schatt wanted state assistance with fallout shelters, 
believing that the government existed for the “protection of the people.”125  Although many 
Americans agreed with this notion of government-built fallout shelters, especially in 
Hawaii, few Arizonans shared this sentiment in their letters.  Running against negative 
opinion about JFK in the state, Louise Stewart supported the President and believed he 
could accomplish victory over Khrushchev.  She complimented Kennedy’s “superb 
intelligence” and asserted, “He is doing his best to serve his country.”  Now, Stewart 
reasoned, Kennedy simply needed to use that intelligence to “outsmart that cagey bully in 
the Kremlin.”126  Thus, some Arizonans had faith that Kennedy could triumph in this Cold 
War crisis.   
 Finally, no consensus seems to exist regarding the West’s reaction to the Berlin 
crisis.  Although many Americans did not want to help the Berliners, a few of The Phoenix 
Gazette readers opposed Berlin for a different reason:  they believed Nazis ruled the West 
German government.  “Where are the Nazis?” by Dorothy Formanack referenced a speech 
by Mr. William Shirer, claiming that Nazis held office in the Bonn government in West 
Germany.  Formanack wanted the United States to immediately “abandon our efforts for a 
unified Germany.”127  These letters reveal aspects of dual containment; in addition to 
Kennedy, Formanack also distrusted the Germans.  In response, Stephen Flindt felt the 
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same desire for “our disengagement from the Bonn government and an unfettered foreign 
policy of our own.”128  This letter indicates that some worried over the resurgent power of 
Germany, and that the country had to be “contained” just as much as the communists.  
Thus, compared to other regions, the U.S. West cared less about Berlin, and more about 
fallout shelters and President Kennedy, in general.  Again, this could be explained by the 
region’s distance from the Soviet Union and Berlin.   
Midwest  
Like the West, the Midwestern states had a more conservative reputation.  In an 
article about the 1960 election results, The New York Times noted that Republicans 
“[swept] from Kansas to the West Coast in [an almost] unbroken grandeur.”129  
Furthermore, Midwesterner historian R. Douglas Hurt claims, “Midwesterners often gave 
more attention to local than international affairs—that is, to the tax rate than the 
possibility of nuclear war.”  Hurt also contends that the region was “often called the 
‘heartland’—that is, the most typical or American part of America.”130  This claim of 
Americanism in the Midwest contradicts with another Midwesterner’s—historian Mary 
Nath’s— version.  She asserts that growing up in the 1950s and 1960s, the region 
encapsulated “narrow conservatism, homogeneity, and an accompanying intolerance.”131  
In order of city size, I compared newspapers in Chicago, Denver, and Omaha to examine 
their views on Berlin.  Like the West’s opinions, some Midwesterners wanted war to prove 
America’s strength, while others looked for peaceful alternatives.  In the letters, fewer 
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Americans from these cities approved of President Kennedy, correlating with the fact that 
only 36 Midwestern districts, including electoral districts in Indiana and Kansas, voted for 
Kennedy, while 93 voted for Nixon in 1960.132  
The Chicago Daily Tribune readers felt passionately about Berlin and wrote about 
the subject more than any other newspaper’s readers.  The newspaper opposed the 
Kennedy administration.  “Tribune Republicanism was definitely of the Midwestern 
conservative variety,” write three historians.133  Although the newspaper was conservative, 
Chicagoans voted earnestly for Kennedy in the 1960 election.  The New York Times 
attributed the city’s Catholicism to the reason 64% of Chicagoans voted for him, while only 
50% of Illinoisans supported JFK.134  Kennedy’s Catholicism may have especially played a 
role when one considers the residents of Illinois voted for the Republican Party in the 
elections prior to 1960.135  In the Chicago newspaper, the conservative letters mainly 
claimed that America acted weak, and its leaders allowed the Soviets to claim a victory over 
Berlin.  The majority of the letters demanded that the United States “do something” against 
the Soviets.  C.E. Schulte and Mrs. Kathryn F. Hirn asserted that the United States lost when 
it waited to take action against the USSR.  They questioned why the country had accepted 
the Wall; they instead demanded that America act aggressively “to combat the colonialism 
of Russia.”136  The writers of “American Silence” and “Nothing to Negotiate” angrily 
determined that the communists would win if America negotiated.  JFK and the 
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“Washington appeasers” appeared inadequate against Soviet power; therefore, they should 
refuse to negotiate.137   
While these letters established America’s weakness, “Back Bending” by John M. 
Radzinski, Jr. and a letter by Peter Wheeler Reiss, claimed that the United States bowed to 
communism.  Reiss said that the “Kennedy administration is hopelessly confused” while it 
watched regions “fall to communism.”138  Finally, Milenko Alexsich questioned America’s 
silence while the “captive nations of the Soviet Empire” lacked freedoms.  Alexsich wanted 
the United States to “demand free elections” in Berlin.139  These Chicago residents, 
disappointed by JFK, wanted the United States to act in Berlin.   
  Many of the September and October letters expressed little sympathy for the 
German people since they blamed them for the crisis.  For example, Dallas Smythe believed 
the United States had been “brought to the brink of war” due to the Germans, especially 
West Germany Chancellor Adenauer, who was supposedly pulling them into war because of 
the upcoming election.140  Like Smythe, John Waligora did not feel that the Germans 
deserved sympathy after having lost the war in 1945.  Waligora wrote of the importance of 
keeping Germany divided because the Germans could try to destroy the United States 
again.141  Many Chicagoans heatedly responded to the letter, “Our Duty in Berlin,” which 
claimed the United States had “morality and [an] obligation” in Berlin.142  Renny 
Kershenbaum, whose family died in the Nazi concentration camps, declared that the United 
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States had no duty to the Berliners.143  These letters evoke anger toward the Germans, and 
show that some Americans had no desire to help them.  Regarding Berlin, the consensus in 
Illinois seemed negative; Chicagoans either criticized President Kennedy’s actions, or they 
condemned the Germans.   
Farther to the west, in Colorado, the Denver Post’s “Open Forum” indicated that 
slightly more of the letters sought a show of strength, even if doing so meant war.  Radys 
Kupper insisted that she preferred war to the “moral paralysis” of Americans.  She tried to 
encourage other women to stand up for America’s anti-atheist beliefs.144  A college student, 
Robert Fleming, lamented the fact that the United States had developed into a “second-rate 
power.” “No longer can we bow down,” even if it means war.145  Rodger Elliott seconded 
this notion because if the United States “backs down anymore […] in Berlin—we will have 
lost the [the world’s] respect.”146  In “Response of Angry Men,” John C. Maraldo agreed with 
West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt that the United States should be making “more than 
diplomatic moves.”  He deemed negotiations an unreasonable option since the Kremlin 
would not budge on Berlin.  Maraldo noted, “We must not fear to become aggressive […] 
and to take the offensive.”147  In addition, M. Lee’s “Positive Stand” protested Drew Pearson, 
an influential journalist, who had opined that Berlin was not worth the effort of a fight.  Lee 
angrily retorted, “If Americans don’t care about the freedom of others then they don’t really 
care about their own freedom.”148  Letters often conjured up a patriotic response of 
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America’s freedom and strength, while expressing embarrassment because of America’s 
lack of action.    
Letters on the other side of the crisis looked for ways to avoid war.  As with many 
other newspapers, the pacifist letters of the Denver Post turned to the United Nations for 
help.  “Innocent Victims,” by M.G Frankel, worried about the children if the crisis turned to 
war, and thus, she begged her leaders to find a solution for peace.  Citing the weakness of 
the U.N., Frankel nonetheless acknowledged that the United Nations needed to be “used 
and strengthened” in this crisis.149  The letter-writer “M.E.G.” agreed, believing that the 
world powers should use the U.N. if negotiations cannot be “reached satisfactorily.”  
Conceding that if the United States could not “get absolute political freedom for the West 
Berliners [then America should] offer them economic help in rebuilding their city in West 
Germany territory.”  M.E.G., however, was not concerned with which viable solution 
emerged out of negotiations, as long as the United States did not “decimate the world on 
their behalf.”150  C.E. Lee added that the United Nations should supervise the complete 
demilitarization of Germany.  That way, no “threat to either East or West” would exist, 
solving the crisis.151  Coloradans seemed divided about going to war or summoning the 
United Nations.  
In another Midwestern town, Omaha, Nebraska, the Omaha World Herald may have 
been more representative of the region when compared to Chicago and Denver, as it 
characterized the majority of small cities and towns.  Omaha produced a small newspaper; 
only the Sunday editions included the Letter to the Editor section.  Nebraskans seemed to 
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desire war over surrendering Berlin, while others wanted their fellow Americans to 
support President Kennedy regarding his foreign policy decisions.   
Many of the Nebraskans supported Berlin freedom, pledged to fight for it, and 
thought JFK unwilling to do so.  R.O. Heister hoped that “negotiations will be successful […] 
But we must not flinch” to fight if they fail.  Heister believed that the United States could not 
hesitate to act because the “Berlin crisis is a trial of strength.”  The author of this letter felt 
that the city should be free, even at the cost of America’s livelihood.152  Similarly, Leroy 
Miles supported the Berliners—their freedom was “worth a war.”  Miles quoted a Bible 
passage that called for one to die for his/her friends.153  His use of the Bible shows that 
many Midwesterners practiced Christianity zealously and used religion to reinforce their 
ideals, as with Berlin.  Furthermore, Angelo Ferraro asserted that he would fight for world 
freedom.  He declared that “I am ready to shoulder a gun even though I may die.”154  In 
addition, several other Nebraskans wanted the United States to act, but did not explicitly 
want to fight.  For example, James Nelson questioned why “we are about to alienate the 
good graces of Germany.”  He did not understand the objective of leaving the city for the 
Soviets and wanted to help the Berliners.  Although Nelson did not provide a solution, he 
opposed America’s containment of the Germanies.155   
Other letters referred to the United States as cowardly.  Patricia G. Wilson claimed 
that, “America has simply lost its guts.” Furthermore, the U.S. “government aimed at selling 
out Americans to communism.”156  Meanwhile, Omaha citizen Albert Walsh highlighted 
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America’s lack of toughness in Berlin.  He pointed to the administration’s failures in Cuba, 
where Kennedy recklessly attempted to oust Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs; and in Laos, 
where Kennedy acted too cautiously and disengaged from the crisis.  In both of the 
unsuccessful conflicts, the United States appeared to lose ground to communism.  Walsh 
insisted, “We can quit worrying about war with Russia” because the government will “find 
something to surrender.”157  These letters viewed the Kennedy administration negatively 
and desired more action in Berlin.   
Although few Nebraskans voted for Kennedy and its residents predominantly voted 
for the Republicans in the previous several elections, a few of the Omaha World Herald 
letters supported Kennedy.158  These letters believed in uniting around the President.  
Larry Leslie declared that JFK “is the man [to defend the freedom of the United States] since 
he was chosen by the people.”159  He suggested that if Americans gave their full support, 
Kennedy could face Khrushchev successfully.  Clarence McKibben also approved of “our 
fine young President” and he believed that Russia “cannot destroy our nation if we face our 
troubles united.”160  But such support was scant for JFK, as was mention of fallout 
shelters.161 
Although Midwesterners were aware of the Berlin crisis, they did not explicitly 
mention the government’s policies or Kennedy’s speeches.  For example, while Denver’s 
readers supported U.N. aid in Berlin, none mentioned Kennedy’s September U.N. address.  
Also, as previously mentioned, very little concern existed regarding fallout shelters, even 
                                                          
157 Albert C. Walsh, Letters to the Editor, Omaha World Herald, August 20, 1961. 
158 Poynter, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 67. 
159 Larry C. Leslie, Letters to the Editor, Omaha World Herald, August 27, 1961. 
160 Clarence McKibben, Letters to the Editor, Omaha World Herald, October 22, 1961. 
161 E.C., Letters to the Editor, Omaha World Herald, November 12, 1961.  This letter was entitled “Shelters for 
Schools;” it was the only letter in Nebraska to reference fallout shelters. 
Goldberg 48 
 
though Kennedy talked about it repeatedly.  Possibly, so few Midwesterners worried about 
fallout shelters, because of the region’s location, far from both the Pacific and Atlantic 
oceans.  Thus, presumably fewer Midwesterners watched Kennedy’s addresses, even 
though they were knowledgeable about the Berlin crisis. 
South  
The South, represented here by Georgia, Mississippi, and Florida, sought a tough 
Cold War position from the President.  Southern historian Joseph Fry asserts that “the 
South’s proclivity for the use of force and adamant anticommunism remained prominent as 
the United States entered the decade of the 1960s.”  In addition, as the letters and polls 
reveal, this region was the most pessimistic “about the long-term prospects for 
international Peace” and their anxieties only increased with the Civil Rights Movement.162  
Although fewer Southerners belonged to the Democratic Party as it moved further left, the 
1960 election revealed that the vast majority voted Democrat.163    
For example, from the years between 1856 and 1964, Georgians voted for the 
Democratic Party twenty-five times. They only voted once for the Republicans—in 1964.164 
Thus, the Georgians disillusionment with Kennedy in the following letters may show them 
starting to fall out with the Democratic Party.   
The Atlanta Constitution’s readers seemed mostly concerned with fallout shelters 
and their mixed feelings for President Kennedy.  To be sure, several of the letters 
complimented Kennedy on his address to the U.N. Assembly (where he firmly advocated 
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for access within Berlin and vilified the Soviet regime).  On September 5, James T. Johnson 
declared that JFK did a great job in “taking care of a situation long overdue” in Berlin.  He 
asserted that Kennedy succeeded in stopping the communist advance by establishing U.S. 
presence in Berlin.165  The October 2 “Pulse of the People” dedicated a section to “Georgians 
Discuss JFK’s Administration and His Address to the UN Assembly,” a week after Kennedy 
gave the speech to the United Nations.  Joseph D. Franco and C.P. Butler applauded 
Kennedy’s speech; Butler insisted that it was “one of the greatest speeches ever” while 
Franco felt the speech “dealt realistically with the Berlin crisis.”166  These letters revealed 
that some Atlanta citizens felt proud of their President. 
Other letters, however, show Kennedy in a more negative light, specifically his 
indecisiveness and lack of action.  G.G. Howe, for example, admitted that the U.N. speech 
was “firm,” but he anticipated that Kennedy would “negotiate away many, if not all, of our 
rights in Berlin.”167  William H. Cohen stated that the Cold War was “directionless,” with 
little foreign policy on Berlin.168  Charles Bird agreed with this notion.  In “Kennedy is 
Accused of Evasiveness,” he claimed that Kennedy refused to have the necessary, honest 
conversation about Berlin in his press conferences.169  As shown previously, the Atlanta 
Constitution’s readers assailed Kennedy’s lack of action in the face of Khrushchev’s games.  
They wanted the Premier out of power.  By November, Georgian citizen Bill J. Jones 
believed that Kennedy’s tough stance with Khrushchev had “fizzled out.”  Jones declared 
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that if he had his way, “we would stomp the living daylights out of [Khrushchev].”170  A high 
school student, Durham Newton, thought America should stop yielding to the USSR.   While 
he conceded that “Berlin itself is not worth risking a war,” he believed America should 
declare war or else the Soviets would try to obtain another region.171  These harsh opinions 
show that Americans were tired of appeasing Khrushchev.   
 Other letters insisted that Berlin was not worth a war; they lacked trust in Berliners.  
In late August, both Philip Shulhafer and Joseph Franco did not believe a “clear moral issue” 
existed in Berlin.  Shulhafer determined that Berlin was wrongly leading the United States 
into war, and Franco deemed that the city had not “practiced nor preached” freedom.172  
These letters showed no sympathy for the Germans; Atlantans feared the Berliners and had 
no desire to risk American lives for them.  Some Georgians wanted to follow a dual 
containment strategy of containing German nationalism by keeping the country separated, 
while keeping communism out of the West. 
Of all the newspapers examined, the Clarion Ledger in Jackson, Mississippi had 
readers who seemed the least concerned about the Berlin crisis.  Instead, the letters that 
related to Berlin mostly discussed the government’s unnecessary defense spending and 
their disapproval of Kennedy.  The Clarion Ledger letters seemed significantly more 
concerned with the new policies of racial integration, and being a small newspaper, the 
editor devoted fewer letters to the Cold War and many more to race issues.173 
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Some of the Mississippi letters worried about U.S. government spending on Berlin.  
On September 2, John Mayes conceded that “from what I have been reading in the 
newspapers […] we must, without a doubt, be living in perilous times.”  He declared that 
Kennedy’s “New Frontier crowd” spent billions “trying to buy friendship and peace,” and 
had failed to do so.  He was convinced that America would declare bankruptcy, giving the 
Soviets victory in the Cold War.174  A.O. Hall repeated several of Mayes’ arguments.  “Surely 
President Kennedy cares enough about his own people that he will put their interests 
ahead of nations, who at most, are questionable friends.”  Hall believed that the 
government should pay for mass fallout shelters for Americans, instead of providing for 
foreign Germans.175  According to historian Fry, Southerners in general were hostile to the 
idea of foreign spending.176  
The Jackson residents did not fully support the Kennedy administration.  On 
September 6, Reverend Harold E. O’Chester compared JFK to a fictional baseball hero “who 
struck out when the team needed him most.”  He showcased Kennedy’s past mistakes, and 
now, he questioned how Kennedy would respond to the “third pitch,” Berlin.  Based on 
Kennedy’s short eight months in office, O’Chester believed that Kennedy would “strike 
out.”177  WM. Mallett loathed Kennedy.  After listing the administration officials who he 
accused of being “Socialists, Subversives, [and] Communists,” Mallett suggested that the 
administration had “gone so far in their attempts to wreck the American Republic.”178  In 
terms of electoral votes, Mississippians did not vote for Kennedy, but neither did they vote 
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for Nixon.  In an assumedly anti-establishment move, the majority of electors refused to 
pledge for either candidate.179   
Besides the following letters, very few of the Clarion Ledger readers referenced a 
solution to the Berlin Wall crisis.  Woo Jung Ju and James F. Brent both declared that the 
United States should not negotiate.  Ju, a graduate student at Mississippi College, said that 
America should not attend the summit meeting at the United Nations because the Soviets 
would use the gathering “to recover lost international face, [and] to regain prestige.”  By 
attending, the United States would participate in “dangerous appeasement;” America would 
lose prestige, while the Soviet Unions’ prestige would increase.180   A couple months into the 
crisis, Brent repeated Ju’s position of not compromising.  He insisted that “we cannot give 
in to the demands by Communists.  We cannot negotiate the un-negotiable.”181  Both 
authors held that the United States should continue its firmness in the face of Soviet 
threats.  In contrast, John Mayes, who had written about government spending a week 
prior, wanted peace between the two world powers.  To achieve such an objective, both 
nations would have to “assure” the other that it would not attack.  He believed strongly in 
peace because he established that “if major powers fail to find a solution […] man will be 
going back to his cave.”182  Mayes feared nuclear war and preferred compromise.  These 
letters prove the varying beliefs the outspoken Mississippians held regarding Berlin.   
 In the Florida newspaper, the Miami Herald, the letters mainly addressed whether 
America should go to war or not.  Florida had more articles specifically related to Berlin 
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than the rest of the South, possibly due the fears triggered by the Bay of Pigs crisis earlier 
in the year.  More Miami readers wanted peace over war, but not by a significant amount.  
Those who did not want war wanted peace using various tactics.  For example, Bernard 
Lichtig insisted that the population of West Berlin move to other parts of West Germany; 
the crisis was not worth nuclear war.183  The author of “Atomic Age Arithmetic Adds up 
War Horror” also feared nuclear war.  She believed that the United States should negotiate, 
especially since Berlin’s fate should not require the eradication of 30 to 40 million 
American lives.184  These letters agreed that American lives meant more than German 
freedoms.  In addition, Martin Barry did not approve of the Germans, especially their 
government.  He determined that the West German government pressured Kennedy to 
increase tensions when the “President prudently limited [the] western response.”185  While 
Barry supported Kennedy, E.A. Gasser felt dissatisfied with the American government’s 
treatment of Berlin.  Gasser previously thought that Berlin was the “symbol of western 
prestige,” but with “another victory for communism,” it no longer held this place.186  
Consequently, due to the government’s lack of planning, the United States should simply 
leave Berlin.  Others who desired peace encouraged participation with the United Nations 
to solve the problem.  Two letters written within a day of each other in September 
requested that the big powers “Call [a] World Meeting to Save the Peace,” while Claude 
Pepper claimed that “World Tribunals Can Help Settle Crisis—If asked.”187  Pepper, the 
writer of this letter, was about to take a House of Representatives seat in Florida.  He first 
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held office in the Senate in 1936, and stayed in politics until his death in 1989, commanding 
much respect as a fervent liberal.188  Both letters summarily believed in the power of the 
World Court and the U.N. to solve this crisis.   
 Many of the letters, however, did want the United States to act more aggressively 
toward Berlin.  Mrs. W.S VanPoyck believed that America had an “obligation to the free 
world” to remain firm as Kennedy said.189  William Dickinson agreed with the notion to 
fight the Soviets.  He said the United States should “fight and die [or] die in slave camps;” 
surrender would only lead to death by the Reds.190  Robert Canon, father of an American 
soldier in Berlin, believed that the United States needed to show more assertiveness for the 
Soviets to take them seriously.191  Although these letters were a minority, such belligerence 
represented many Americans’ beliefs about the Berlin crisis.  In particular, the South had 
strong opinions about the Cold War, though less so for Berlin.  In 1961, integration, 
religion, and other domestic issues held the passions of Southerners over Berlin.  Miami 
citizens, however, had more similar concerns with Easterners rather than Southerners, 
likely because of their proximity to Europe.   
East  
The Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, and Boston Globe were assessed to 
evaluate the East Coast opinion on Berlin.  Based on the 1960 election results, the East 
supported Kennedy over Nixon by a relatively wide margin.192  The Wall Street Journal, a 
more conservative business newspaper, seemed to have more readers willing to explore 
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the option of going to war over Berlin.  Many of the letter writers would have rather gone 
to war than give in to the communists.  For example, after J.D. Markwood wrote that the 
United States should abandon Allied Berlin to avoid “possible nuclear conflict,” angry 
letters appeared in response.193  One called Markwood a “befuddled” thinker and asserted 
that the United States should not “compromise with communists,” even to avoid nuclear 
war.  That Berlin lay within in the Soviet zone was due only to Soviet dictator Josef Stalin’s 
“trickery” after World War II.194  Similarly, M.B. Somerfield vehemently disagreed with 
relinquishing Berlin.  The author claimed that the ideology that controlled Berlin would 
control the world.  An Allied Berlin hindered the spread of communism beyond East 
Europe.195 
Many of the letters show that the readers thought President Kennedy was weak.  
“Defending Our Rights” called Kennedy’s actions appeasement and compared him to the 
pre-World War II appeaser, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.196  Hugh Brenner 
subscribed to this representation of Kennedy and questioned why his words, but not his 
actions, were firm.197  F.C. Brandt alleged that Americans knew what Washington did not: 
that the United States needed firmness when dealing with the communists for them to 
cease their aggression.  America could “command the respect of the rest of the world” in 
Berlin, but according to Brandt, the government did not seem to understand that.198  
Although New Yorkers voted for Kennedy in the 1960 election, they voted for the 
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Republican candidate in three out of the four prior elections.199  Thus, Kennedy would need 
to be stronger to gain the respect of these readers.   
As opposed to the New York newspaper, the Washington Post was relatively anti-
war, and offered alternative suggestions.  Residents of Washington, D.C. were unable to 
vote in presidential elections until 1963.  Nonetheless, the city was relatively liberal leaning 
and presumably, most of the citizens were Kennedy supporters.200   With its close 
proximity to the White House, it received information quicker than other sources in the 
various regions, especially if the newspaper presented the administration in a positive 
light.  Kern, Levering, and Levering assert that high government officials would “alert them 
to the issues the administration considered most important […] the Post dared not risk 
being cut off by the high level sources who contributed so substantially to its success.”  
Thus, “The Post by the early 1960s was the most influential paper in the capital.”201  
Consequently, the newspaper’s more liberal view of the Berlin crisis may have influenced 
many Americans to observe the crisis in the way Kennedy hoped.  Many of the letters 
vehemently disagreed with military action in Berlin.  A few days after the Berlin Wall was 
constructed, the writer of “Quiet Diplomacy” feared that “political warfare” would lead to a 
third world war.  Therefore, the he suggested a conference to discuss and even fix the 
problems.202  American History Professor Herbert Clancy of Fordham agreed with this 
solution and furthered it by proposing an international conference to force the Soviets to 
follow Stalin’s promise of free elections for East Berlin; otherwise, the United States should 
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implement trade sanctions.203  In addition, John Harcourt believed that Berlin should fall 
under full United Nation control, as the U.N. had “world authority.”  The agreement would 
make Berlin “a disarmed area,” which would bring the world closer to universal 
disarmament.204 Other letters show American disdain for the military buildup.  Evelyn 
Johnson asserted that “Our military obsession is losing democracy’s battles.” She believed 
in “peaceful techniques” to solve the crisis, not militaristic ones.205  In “Aiding Mr. K?,” the 
writer also questioned the $6 billion military build-up because it might devalue the dollar 
and force America into poverty.206  These letters searched for peace, mainly for financial 
justifications, but also for moral and political reasons. 
The Boston Globe looked less at whether or not America should go to war, and 
instead questioned why it should help the Germans, who had already instigated two world 
wars in less than a century.  From August to September, at least one letter each week 
referred to this issue.  Only two days after Ulbricht’s government built the Wall, “Should We 
Help Them Again” asked why the United States should aid the Germans, when the Berlin 
situation was their own fault “with their horrible war record.”  The author, Edward 
Bowker, knew that that the Germans would “sacrifice the lives of 10 million Americans” if it 
meant the restoration of their city.207  These harsh notions showed the lack of support 
these readers had for the Berliners.  At the beginning of September, Bowker shared similar 
opinions and retorted that even though the West Germans feared Soviet tyranny, they 
should have kept “their own tyranny from other people’s lands.”208  Relatedly, Mrs. Victor 
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Penzer believed that America should not fight for German freedoms since the Soviets 
treated the Berliners better than the Germans had treated the Soviets in World War II.209  
In addition, William Treadwill questioned why, even after the Nazi regime, democracy in 
Berlin sufficed as a reason for the United States to trust the West Germans.  He claimed the 
West Germans only acted democratically because they feared Soviet control.210  German 
atrocities remained clear in the minds of Americans twenty years after the war, and played 
into the strategy of dual containment.   
Furthermore, like the Washington Post, several letters requested U.N. support for 
the Berlin issue.  In “What UN is For,” James Psellas asked why the world was “risking a 
war” when the United Nations existed to solve such problems.211  Months after the erection 
of the Berlin Wall, Francis Morse thought that the U.N. should move its headquarters from 
New York City to Berlin.  Then, the Soviet Union and the United States would be “off the 
hook” to fix the crisis since the current plan of “insisting on our ‘rights’” did not seem to 
work; it only increased “Cold War bitterness.”212   The idea of moving the United Nations 
continued to arise throughout the crisis.  Those who insisted on moving it believed in the 
U.N.’s effectiveness as an international governing body.  Upon the death of U.N. Secretary 
General Hammarskjold in September, however, the U.N. itself was experiencing its own 
crisis that made the proposal unfeasible.   
Even though the majority of Bostonians seemed against helping Berlin, they 
supported the President in his actions.  80% of Bostonians voted for Kennedy in the 
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Presidential election.213  This significant majority may be due in part to the city’s Catholic 
roots.  Another noteworthy reason may have been that Kennedy grew up in the region and 
served as its representative in the US Congress.  George Taylor had faith that Kennedy “will 
back up his words with deeds” in order to prove Khrushchev wrong that “we won’t start a 
war because of Berlin.”214  The writer of “More Harm than Good” also agreed with Kennedy, 
but in contrast to Taylor, he approved of Kennedy’s decision that “atomic weapons would 
only be used if used on us first.”215  Finally, Barbara Harking defended the President against 
his critics who are “complaining” about the high taxes due to the military budget increase.  
She noted that Kennedy campaigned on “sacrifice,” which the American people now had to 
endure in order to avoid nuclear war and help Berlin.216  The Boston Globe readers 
supported Kennedy, but for various reasons that often contradicted one another.  This 
inconsistency shows that Americans did not fully understand Kennedy’s stance since he 
often sounded like a warmonger, while pursuing diplomacy.   
Regional newspapers reveal key aspects of public perceptions.  The twelve 
newspapers from the four regions showed distinctive characteristics.  The West worried 
most about fallout shelters; the Midwest mainly disapproved of Kennedy’s weak actions in 
Berlin; the South cared little about Berlin; and the East discussed whether the United States 
should go to war.  The states that had coastal, large metropolitan cities, seemed to yield the 
most concern about nuclear war for Americans.  For example, Omaha, a small city in the 
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middle of the country, very rarely mentioned worries of nuclear war, unlike the West, 
especially Hawaii, which regularly commented on the benefits of fallout shelters.   
Through these newspapers, it seemed that Americans were informed of the events 
of the Cold War and Kennedy’s addresses on Berlin, as many letters referenced specific 
speeches, especially the U.N. speech and the July speech that first mentioned Berlin.  For 
example, at the end of September, the Atlanta Constitution dedicated its letters to the editor 
section to discussion Kennedy’s speech to the United Nations.  Enough Americans listened 
to this speech to participate in the dialogue by writing letters to their newspapers.  
Furthermore, regions’ political stances often correlated with the political stance of 
the partisan newspapers.  For example, the West and Midwest encompassed conservatism, 
and their newspapers portrayed their sensibilities with conservative editorials and letters.  
In Denver, moreover, when the city’s newspaper published a column by liberal editorialist 
Drew Pearson, a Coloradan wrote a letter vehemently protesting the idea that Berlin was 
not worth fighting for by claiming that if that was the case, then “America is not worth 
fighting for.”217  
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Chapter IV 
Polling Americans: 
“War! I don’t believe in giving them another inch.” 
 
Regional and national polls also help determine public opinion.  Polls indicate strong 
support for President Kennedy during the Berlin crisis, but the public feared nuclear war.  
In relation to the Berlin Wall, the polls asked questions about the satisfaction of Americans 
toward their leaders, their feelings toward war, peacekeeping ideas regarding Berlin, and 
the means of protection they endorsed against nuclear war.  Many of the polls, both 
regional and national, asked the same types of questions in different months, enabling 
analysis of a potential shift in public opinion over a short amount of time. 
Only seven months into his tenure, JFK had endured the Bay of Pigs disaster, 
unsuccessfully met with Khrushchev in Vienna, and watched the deteriorating situation in 
Laos.  As July concluded, and after Kennedy revealed his concerns about Berlin on July 25, 
1961, the Gallup polling organization asked, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way 
John Kennedy is handling his job as President?”218  From this point through 1961, 
perceptions of Kennedy’s job performance (which included domestic and foreign affairs) 
remained overwhelmingly favorable.  Nationally, this poll showed that 77% of Americans 
approved of Kennedy and only 12% disapproved.  Regionally, these numbers remained 
consistent.  The percentages in the East and the Midwest stayed within the margin of error 
(plus or minus three percent), while the South and West had relatively lower approval 
ratings, with 66% and 71% approving, respectively.219  As the crisis escalated, Gallup asked 
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this question again in both September and October.  Kennedy’s popularity remained 
consistent with, respectively, 76% and 77% of the population approving of him.220   
Regionally, California and Wisconsin asked their citizens the same question, but in 
terms of whether they thought Kennedy “is doing a good, fair, or poor job.”  Between the 
Midwest and West, significant differences for Kennedy’s approval existed.  In Wisconsin, 
43% believed Kennedy was doing a “Good” job in late August.221  A mere month later, 63% 
of Californians answered that he was doing “good.”222  One could argue that the change in 
highly favorable ratings may have involved the speeches Kennedy gave that month (for 
example for U.N. speech), but the national poll did not reflect that difference.  Thus, the 
West seems generally more favorable of Kennedy than the Midwest.   
These polls correlate spectacularly with the survey, “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied 
with the way the United States Government is handling the Berlin situation?”  In both late 
August and late September, the public expressed satisfaction over 60% of the time.223  
Admittedly, from the time the Soviets erected the Wall to the following month, the public 
ratings fell 5%.224  Although not a significant drop, Americans were nonetheless concerned 
with the administration’s handling of the crisis.  The Trendex Public Opinion Poll asked 
New Yorkers the same question about Berlin that the Gallup Poll asked nationally, but in 
direct relation to the U.N. speech.  Some 63% of New Yorkers felt satisfied with the 
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government in Berlin, which was almost the same percentage as the rest of America.225  
New Jerseyites seemed to share similar sentiments with New Yorkers; Gallup revealed a 
New Jersey woman’s thoughts on the issue in the Clarion Ledger.  “I think the Berlin 
situation is being handled well.  They did the right thing in calling up the troops—it was a 
show of strength without fighting.  And they’re willing to negotiate, not running into it.  
They’ve taken a firm policy without open warfare or cringing.”226  Thus, Kennedy enjoyed 
significant popularity at this time, and the satisfaction regarding his administration’s 
handling of Berlin at the beginning of the crisis only added to his favorable ratings.  
Conversely, although the majority of Americans said he handled Berlin properly in August 
and September, by November, Americans alluded to Berlin when listing his weaknesses.  
Therefore, it appears that the farther the region was from the crisis, the more they disliked 
Kennedy.  In the top five answers of the Gallup poll, the public responded that he was 
“Hesitant in actions, indecisive,” “Too weak in foreign policy, pushed around by Premier 
Khrushchev,” and “Doesn’t back up words with action, hasn’t lived up to promises.”227  This 
poll shows that the public found him to be a pushover; he did not act when Khrushchev 
broke the agreement of restricting access to Berlin by building the Wall.   
        Furthermore, Americans seemed both to encourage and fear war during the months 
following the crisis.  Polling questions asked at which point the United States should turn to 
war.  For example, every month from July to October, pollsters asked, “If Communist East 
Germany closes all roads to Berlin and does not permit planes to land in Berlin, do you 
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think the United States and its Allies should or should not try to fight their way into 
Berlin?”  A majority answered that the United States and its allies should fight, but the 
amount varied from month to month.  In late July, the Kennedy administration found that 
nationally, 67% thought the United States should fight for Berlin, and 16% disagreed.228  
Regionally, the West and East had similar numbers to the national poll, but the Midwest 
and South did not.  The Midwest was more willing to fight the Soviets—72% believed 
America should act aggressively.  A poll released by McClure Newspaper Syndicate, 
described the public’s views, including this Ohio woman’s opinion: “War! […] I don’t believe 
in giving them another inch.”229  This sentiment seemed compatible in the Midwest, as the 
poll numbers show.  The opposite held true in the South.  Fewer Southerners (only 59%) 
wanted to fight, which disproved Fry’s theory that the South was more militaristic than the 
rest of the country.230  Even though the administration released the poll before Kennedy 
spoke publically about Berlin, an August poll revealed that 64% agreed to fight for Berlin; 
this poll, which was circulated after the Wall went up, had numbers similar to the July 
poll.231  By the following month, however, 6% more Americans wanted to fight than in 
August.232  Nonetheless, by October, the amount of Americans who wanted to fight 
decreased to 62%.233  These numbers may have changed because of the way Kennedy 
spoke about Berlin to the public from month to month.  From July to September, Kennedy’s 
rhetoric included aggression, but by October, he spoke more often about negotiations.   
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 Other questions included whether the United States should go to war over the right 
of East Berliners to hold elections to decide their system of government.  The Kennedy 
administration asked, “Do you think the U.S. and its Allies should back up this right, even if 
it means going to war?”  Fewer Americans, nationally, would fight for the right of elections 
than if the Soviet Union cut off access.  Nonetheless, 58% of Americans believed in this right 
and would fight for it.  Again, the South was less willing to fight, as only 52% of Southerners 
echoed that sentiment.  Interestingly, Westerners (at a 63% approval rate) seemed most 
impassioned about the topic of elections.  The other regions fell within this criterion.234   
Other issues also yielded results that showed Americans were determined to stay in 
Berlin through the crisis.  In July, the administration asked about U.S. troops in Berlin, 
specifically, “Do you think we should pull out our troops and leave West Berlin exposed to a 
take-over by Russia—or keep our troops in West Berlin even if it means risking war?” 
Nationally, 6% of Americans wanted to pull out troops, while 85% disagreed with this act.  
Again, the South and West appeared as the outliers.235  In addition, the administration’s July 
poll and an October Gallup poll asked, “If Russia insists on controlling Berlin, do you think 
this will lead to a fighting war, or not?” Even though three months had passed, both polls 
reported that 59% of Americans thought Soviet control would lead to war.236  In July, both 
the East and the West thought war was less likely than the Midwest and South did, by a 
10% difference.237  Nonetheless, every month that went by showed that a significant 
amount of the population supported military intervention. 
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 Several questions inquired about America’s actions regarding Berlin, war or other 
peacekeeping methods.  For example, in Wisconsin, a poll asked, “If you have read or heard 
something about the Berlin crisis, what do you think should be the actions of the U.S.?” The 
most popular answer, by almost 20%, declared, “We should let the Russians know that if 
necessary we will fight to hold the city.”238  This poll, along with the others, hinted at the 
Midwest’s willingness to fight.  Another poll in July questioned, “If Russia should take a 
separate treaty with East Berlin and if the East German government should refuse access to 
West Berlin, what steps, if any, do you think the United States should take to save West 
Berlin from the Communists?”  Some 55% of Americans believed they should go to “war or 
risk war,” while only 6.5% claimed “Peace at any price.”239  In the middle of these extremes, 
22% believed that America should “Take positive action,” which included doing “what 
government thinks necessary,” and “action by the United Nations” as the most significant 
percentages in that category.240  In New York, pollsters questioned the motives of 
respondents who answered that they were not satisfied with the government’s actions 
pertaining to the Soviet Union.  77% of dissatisfied Americans felt frustrated with the 
Berlin crisis because they wanted the United States to be “firmer in its position,” while only 
18% wanted them to be “more willing to negotiate.”241  These percentages show the 
assertiveness of Americans. 
 In September, just 5% of Americans desired action by the United Nations in the poll 
asking what America should do.  The results differed in July though, when the Kennedy 
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administration asked questions about the U.N.’s role in Berlin.  “Do you think the United 
Nations should or should not try to settle the Berlin problem between Russia and the U.S. 
and its Allies?”  Nationally, 80% expressed that the U.N. should settle the problem.  In this 
poll, the South had the least faith in the U.N., while 84% of the East Coast trusted the 
institution.242  Nonetheless, when the poll asked whether the U.N. “can or cannot settle it,” 
the answers changed.  Nationally, only one in four Americans thought the United Nations 
was capable of settling the crisis.  For this question, the Midwest had the most confidence in 
the U.N. with 47% agreeing that it could settle the crisis, while only one in three 
Southerners held the same opinion.243  Interestingly, whether questions used “should” or 
“can,” in relation to the U.N., significantly changed American opinion.  Consequently, 
Americans wanted U.N. involvement but had little faith that the institution could actually 
help.   
        The most striking question involved America turning communist in the event of a 
war precipitated by a crisis like Berlin.  In October, Gallup asked Americans, “Suppose you 
had to make the decision between fighting an all-out nuclear war or living under 
communist rule—how would you decide?”  In a flourish of anti-communist sentiment, a 
tremendous 81% of Americans claimed to prefer nuclear war to communism.  Only 6% said 
they would rather convert to communism.244  Incredibly more than eight out of ten 
Americans would rather suffer nuclear war than live as communists. 
But Americans had not prepared for this reality.  In September and November, 
Gallup asked Americans if they had made any plans to prepare their homes or protect their 
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family from a nuclear attack.  In September, only 7% said they made plans to protect their 
homes, and in November, after months of Kennedy discussing fallout shelters, only 12% 
said they planned to make any changes in case of a nuclear weapons attack.245  Considering 
Americans’ talk of war, surprisingly, they had not seriously considered protecting 
themselves or property.  On the other hand, during the same November survey, 60% said 
they had given some thought to life in a fallout shelter.246   
Americans certainly had reason to suspect nuclear war, based on the fact that they 
believed the conflict with the Soviet Union would continue.  In October, Gallup asked, “If the 
Berlin problem is solved peacefully, do you think there will be a long period of peace, or do 
you think the Russians will stir up strife again in the future?”  By a significant minority, only 
12% thought that there would be “a long period of peace,” while 78% thought the 
“Russians will stir up strife.”247  Americans believed that Cold War crises, as in Berlin, could 
lead to a Soviet nuclear attack.   
After examining these polls, one would assume that JFK had public support 
regarding Berlin.  Questions seemed to shift from war over the Berlin Wall to nuclear war, 
culminating in a primary focus on fallout shelters in November.  In terms of each region’s 
thoughts, the polls indicated that the Midwest and the West were most willing to fight.  The 
South did not want to go to war, but it expected war more than the other regions.  For 
instance, a July poll asked, “Do you think there will be a world war within the next five 
years, or not?”  Nationally, 38% of Americans believed war would strike, while 41% did not 
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think war was imminent (many claimed not to know).  In comparison, 45% of the South 
was certain of war, while only 31% did not think there would be war.248  In addition, the 
East followed national averages more often than not.  Examining polls and their results at 
least partially determines public opinion.  Furthermore, the shift in poll questions and 
results show that public opinion changed during the crisis. 
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Conclusion 
The Future: “Ich bin ein Berliner” 
The city of Berlin stands as a symbol of the Cold War.  The Cold War period began in 
1948 with the blockade of Berlin, and the fall of the Berlin Wall occurred at its culmination.  
In the course of the Cold War, the Berlin crisis made 1961 a definitive year.  The Berlin Wall 
stands as a prime example of Cold War tensions— neither side fired a bullet at the other, 
nor did the conflict affect the daily lives of Americans or Soviets.  Only a rather overlooked 
third party (Berliners) felt its impact.  Nonetheless, the world feared a nuclear conflict 
when Berlin grabbed headlines on the night of August 13, 1961.   
Most scholars would argue that Khrushchev won because the Soviets disregarded 
the treaty agreement, with little retaliation by the Americans.  But on June 26, 1963, nearly 
two years after the erection of the Wall, Kennedy stood among enthusiastic fans in Berlin 
and announced that he was, like all citizens of the world, “Ich bin ein Berliner.”249  The 
German audience cheered fervently for this show of commitment to their city.   
By 1964, the main actors of the Berlin crisis no longer affected the situation.  
Chancellor Adenauer and Premier Khrushchev were forced out of office in 1963 and 1964, 
respectively, while President Kennedy was assassinated.  Besides agreements between the 
world powers, including the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971 that regulated 
access to the city; Berlin settled into the status quo of its physical division until 1989.250  
Therefore, the Berlin Wall crisis diminished a decade after its creation. Twenty-eight years 
after the Berlin Wall went up, on November 9, 1989, the barrier fell.  As masses arrived in 
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the city from across the world to remove the graffitied pieces of the broken Wall, Berlin 
reunited.   
Implications 
The Berlin Wall had been a hot point in the Cold War, the focus of political leaders, 
editorialists, news articles, and the public.  Commentators deliberated about Berlin for 
months after the start of the crisis.  The public response to the Berlin crisis remains 
significant because it shaped Kennedy’s diplomacy on the issue.  The crisis also was 
important to his domestic political standing.  That the general American public did not 
demand immediate war likely boosted his efforts to keep the crisis from escalating into 
armed conflict.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that public response influenced JFK, but 
that he shaped public response through his speeches and conferences to a greater extent.  
Americans trusted Kennedy to take the necessary measures to avert war and 
contain both the Soviets and the West Germans.  His approval ratings stayed consistently 
high.  Still, even as opinion polls backed the President, many letters to the editor 
disapproved of his handling of the crisis.  In addition, Kennedy’s speeches seemed to 
manipulate the American people.  He did not reveal his thoughts on Berlin, especially the 
need for dual containment.  By tolerating the egregious life changes the Berliners had to 
endure with the erection of the Wall, JFK disregarded their suffering in order to lessen 
tensions.  In sum, Americans agreed with Kennedy that while he had a responsibility to the 
individual Berliners; he had to avoid nuclear holocaust at all cost.   
 While this thesis presumed that polls would most reveal American opinion, it was 
the letters that showed Americans’ true feelings.  In letters, Americans were able fully to 
develop their opinions, not simply answer a multiple-choice question. 
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Furthermore, my expectation regarding regional opinions changed when analyzing 
the data, due to modern assumptions of regional stereotypes.  For example, the South 
simply did not care about the crisis in 1961, so the region was not as conservative as 
previously presumed.  In contrast, the views of the Midwest met expectations; it was more 
conservative, desiring war or firm action, as seen in letters and polls.  The West, back in the 
early 1960s was also conservative, a surprising finding considering its liberalism today.  
Even the East did not poll according to expectations, as many of the letters and polls did not 
seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis; but in general, Easterners had practical concerns 
and largely sided with Kennedy.  Historians should examine American regions because 
even regarding this crisis, of national and international importance, regions differ based on 
local political affiliations. 
 This research is an attempt to add to the scholarly work on the Berlin Wall by 
adding a new dimension—the American public— to the crisis.  Historians have examined 
the political implications of the crisis, but not its public impact.  Instead, scholars analyze 
the media and the government because of the influence of these institutions.  In contrast, 
scholars rarely use letters to the editor to analyze history, and they often utilize polls to 
support their argument rather than as a focus of the research.   This thesis showed that the 
public response, and Kennedy’s manipulation of that response, were important factors in 
shaping American foreign policy during one of the most notable crises of the Cold War. 
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